It is widely accepted that U.S. business expansions have been longer and contractions shorter since the end of World War II. Although previous writers have presented formal statistical tests results in support this proposition, they uniformly assume that the change in business-cycle behavior began during or after the war-they do not ask when the change in business-cycle behavior began. Using NBER reference dates, this paper examines this question by dividing the sample at several different places, thereby determining when it is most likely that the change in behavior began. It is found that it is most likely that business-cycle expansions became longer beginnning with the March 1933 expansion, a date which coincides with the U.S. leaving the gold standard. Our results are robust to consideration of Romer's (1994 Romer's ( , 1999 alternative business-cycle chronology.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that the character of U.S. business cycles after World War II has been different from that before the war. In particular, as measured by NBER reference dates, the average length of a business-cycle expansion has grown from 26.5 months during the prewar period to 51.5 months during the post-war period.
1 Meanwhile, the length of contractions has fallen from 21.2 months during the prewar period to 10.4 months during the post-war period.
While the changed character of the U.S. business cycle is generally accepted and many explanations have been proposed, there is no single, generally-accepted explanation. This paper proposes that the changed character of U.S. business cycles is the result of a change in monetary policy, in particular the decision of the U.S. government to leave the gold standard in April 1933.
In support of this claim, this paper presents results of non-parametric statistical tests (similar to those used by Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) ) that imply that the character of U.S. business cycles changed beginning with the 1933 economic expansion rather than after World War II.
Although World War II is a convenient time to divide the data on business cycles, it is an arbitrary choice in the sense that previous writers have not tested whether this is the optimal date at which to divide the sample. 2 In contrast, this paper presents statistical tests that can be used to test when it is most likely that business expansions became longer. To do this the sample of all business-cycle expansions is divided into two sub-samples: an earlier one in which it is believed expansions are relatively short and a later one in which it is believed that expansions are relatively long. The null hypothesis of each test is that expansions have the same "length" in both sub-samples, while the alternative hypothesis is that expansions have a longer "length" in the later sub-sample. Changing the last expansion in the earlier sub-sample (or the first cycle in the later sub-sample) yields observations on marginal significance levels that are used to determine when it is most likely business expansions became longer.
For expansions, we find that the recovery that began in March 1933 is the most likely candidate for the first expansion in the later sub-sample. Upon reflection, this result should not be surprising. This 50-month expansion was the longest on record at that time and was 14 months longer than the previous longest peacetime expansion. In April of 1933, the United
States left the gold standard. Thus, the break in the series on business-cycle expansions coincides with a major economic event that itself is theoretically consistent with this change in behavior. In particular, the timing of these two events is consistent with macroeconomic models in which there is a short-run nonneutrality of money and in which discretionary monetary policy has some scope for reducing business-cycle fluctuations. It is worth noting, however, that as predicted by many models within which discretionary monetary policy can be used to reduce output fluctuations, the price of this increased stability (as measured by duration) has been inflation. The end of the gold standard marked the end of long-run price stability in the United
States and marked the beginning of a persistent inflationary bias in policymaking.
The methodology employed here closely follows that of Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) who use the nonparametric Wilcoxon (or rank sum) test to determine whether post-World II business cycles are drawn from a distribution with a longer "length" parameter than the prewar cycles. They find strong evidence not only that expansions are longer, but also that contractions are shorter during the postwar period. While their results are robust to alternative specifications of the prewar sample and to the elimination of two questionable contractions in the prewar period, 3 they do not address the question explicitly addressed here: when did the change in business-cycle behavior begin?
Although this paper finds clear evidence that expansions became longer at the same time that the United States left the gold standard, the evidence for when contractions became shorter is less clear. When all contractions are considered, the most likely first recession in the later sample is the February 1945 recession, the second recession after the United States left the gold standard.
If the sample includes only recessions following non-wartime expansions, then the most likely first recession in the later sub-sample is either the first post-gold recession in 1937 or the first postwar recession in 1948.
Finally, this paper examines whole cycle effects by measuring the ratio of an expansion to the following contraction. For this series, the later sub-sample most-likely begins with the business cycle that began in March 1933. Again, this coincides with the United States leaving gold in April of that year. Romer (1994) has questioned the accuracy of the prewar NBER business-cycle reference dates and has presented an alternative set of dates. To check the robustness of our findings, we reproduce some of our tests with her dates. Under her alternative chronology, there has been very little change over time in the length of business-cycle contractions, thus the hypothesis that contraction length has not changed is never rejected. For expansions it is found that the most likely first expansion in the second sub-sample is the expansion that Romer identifies as beginning in March of 1940. However, when the ratio of expansion to the following contraction is used to consider whole cycle effects, it is found that the first post gold standard business cycle is also the first cycle in the later sub-sample. That is, we find strong evidence that the timing of the change in business-cycle behavior coincides with the United States leaving the gold standard.
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that the change in business-cycle behavior was linked with a change in the monetary regime. Since deposit insurance was adopted in 1934, we cannot separately identify the effects of this change and the effects of the change of the monetary regime on the business cycle. Both changes are likely to have complemented one another in producing greater stability in the post 1933 era. While there may have been important changes in fiscal policy over time, it is not clear that fiscal policy was strongly countercyclical during the Great Depression (Brown 1956 ). Other explanations for changes in business cycle behavior, such as changes in the sectoral composition of output (i.e., the growth of the service sector of the economy) do not predict a sharp break in behavior in 1933. In addition, as mentioned above, the increased stability of the United States economy has been accompanied by a steady increase in the price level (which also began in 1933). The change in the monetary regime in 1933 is consistent with the simultaneous reduction in business cycle severity coupled with the emergence of an inflationary bias, while other explanations for the change in business cycle behavior are not.
As a result, we choose to emphasize role played by the ending of the gold standard in April of 4 It is appropriate to point out that there are other differences between pre-and post-war business cycles that this paper does not address. For example, declines in output during recessions since the war appear to be smaller than those before the war. Romer (1986) argues that this lower volatility of output in the postwar data largely reflects differences in the construction of the data in the prewar and postwar periods, while Balke and Gordon (1989) dispute her contention.
Another difference in the pre-and post-war data is the apparent tendency of pre-war expansions to die of old age, whereas post-war ones do not. For example, using nonparametric methods, Diebold and Rudebusch (1990) find no evidence of duration dependence for expansions in the postwar data, but do find duration dependence in the prewar data. In a similar
vein, but using a parametric hazard model instead, Sichel (1991) finds evidence of positive duration dependence for expansions during the prewar data, but not during the post-war period.
Sichel also finds that contractions exhibit positive duration dependence during the postwar era.
That is, during the post-war period, the probability that an expansion is going to end does not appear to increase with age, whereas the probability that a contraction is going to end does increase with its age. was technically on a bimetallic standard until 1873, but due to the mint ratio of 16 to 1 had been effectively on a gold standard from the 1830's (Yeager, 1976: 296) . The U.S. was forced off gold during the Civil War, but a return to gold after the war was both planned and expected.
Resumption of the gold standard occurred in 1879.
Although World War I disrupted the gold standard, the U.S. returned to gold by 1919 (Yeager, 1976: 330 (Yeager, 1976: 350) . Furthermore, for many countries, the timing of the departure from gold coincided with the beginning of their recovery from the depression (Eichengreen, 1992) . This is consistent with our finding that the change of monetary regime is associated with a change in business cycle behavior.
While some relationship between the dollar and gold was maintained until the early 1970's, the United States was never again on a true gold standard. Private holdings of gold bullion were made illegal in the U.S. in April 1933 and in June of that year, Congress abrogated the gold clause in public and private contracts (Yeager, 1976: 349-50) . The fixing of the gold price at $35 per ounce in January of 1934 was valid only for official transactions (Friedman and Schwartz 1963: 469-70) . Friedman and Schwartz (1963: 471) Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) we use the rank-sum test to determine when the change in U.S. business cycle behavior occurred. We do this by testing several breaks in the data set, where for each break it is assumed that the sample of expansions (recessions) both before and after the proposed break are observations drawn from distributions that are identical in all respects except location. The date for which there is the maximum probability that a change in business cycle behavior has occurred is chosen as the breakpoint in the data.
Let X i denote an observation of a duration, where there are n observations in total, and i= 1 is the first observation and i=n is the last. 5 The breakpoint in the data set (to be chosen endogenously) is denoted by the observation i=B. This allows us to break our sample into two subsamples { } 7 periods, i.e., F=G. As in Diebold and Rudebusch (1992: 998) we will use a one sided alternative hypothesis. This reflects the prior expectation that expansions are longer and contractions are shorter in the second sample. Thus, for expansions, our alternative hypothesis is (i) F ≠ G and . Diebold and Rudebusch resolve ties by using an average rank, i.e., two expansions tied for 6th would both be entered as rank 6.5. In contrast (following the advice of Bradley, 1968, pp. 48-54) , we resolve ties by choosing the ranking which is least favorable to our alternative hypothesis. 6 Thus, in the case of a tie, we will assign a lower rank to observations in the second sample for expansions and a higher rank in the second sample for contractions. This resolution of ties is in recognition of the fact that while our data is discrete, the underlying process generating the data is continuous.
Thus, true ties are measure zero events (see Bradley, 1968) and occur only because of our inability to measure expansion or recession length more accurately.
The Wilcoxon test statistic is simply the sum of the ranks in the second sample:
Critical values for the Wilcoxon test statistic may be found in Bradley (1968) .
Results

Length of Expansions
Tables 2-6 summarize evidence that support that contention that after the United States left the gold standard in March 1933, expansions became longer. Table 2 presents results the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon statistics for several breaks in the sample that includes all 31 expansions. The expansion listed in the first column is the first expansion included in the second sample. The null hypothesis is that expansions in the second sample are the same length as expansions in the first sample verses the alternative that expansions in the second sample are longer. The maintained hypothesis is that other characteristics of expansions in the two samples are identical.
The first row in Table 2 assumes that the first expansion in the second sample is the expansion that began in July 1921. (This is the first entry in the table because the March 1919 expansion is the shortest on record.) The second column reports that the Wilcoxon rank sum test for this break in the sample is 165, which with 17 observations in the first sample and 14 in the second sample is significant at the 0.01 level (from Table III of Bradley, 1968) . The fifth column reports the standard normal deviate (Z)(using the equation in Gibbons, 1976,p. 164 ) based on the Wilcoxon statistic in column 2 and the number of observations in columns 3 and 4. When the first observation in the second sample is the expansion that began in July 1921, the Z value is -2.32 which (as reported in the last column) has a marginal significance level equal to 0.010.
As seen in Table 2 , the hypothesis that there is no change in the duration of expansions is rejected for each of the possible break points presented in the table. But this is not surprising since for each of the tests presented in Table 2 , the second sample includes the longest expansions of the sample (the 106-month expansion beginning in 1961 and the 92-month expansion that began in 1982.) But the highest level of significance reported in Table 2 occurs when the first observation in the second sample is the first post-gold standard expansion (March 1933) . This supports the proposition that expansion length increased at the same time that the United States left the gold standard. Table 3 repeats the tests from Table 2 but uses a sample that excludes all war-time expansions. Again, at standard significance levels, for each break in the sample considered in Table 3 , the hypothesis of no increase in the lengths of expansions is rejected. But again, the highest significance level is obtained if the first expansion in the second sample is the first postgold standard expansion.
Another way to examine the issue is to ask whether an observer should have suspected a change in the length of expansions based upon observing the most recent expansion. That is, should an observer have suspected that there had been a change in whatever it is that determines the average length of expansions after the 50-month expansion that began in 1933? Or would it have been unreasonable to conclude that a change in the length of expansions had not occurred until sometime after the second world war?
This questions can be answered in the following way. Assume that the determinant of expansion length is the same for all expansions prior to the expansion beginning in July of 1924.
Then as each new expansion is observed, one can use the Wilcoxon statistic to test whether the latest expansion is from the same sample as the initial sample of expansions. The results from implementing this procedure are presented in Table 4 for a sample that includes all expansions. Table 5 repeats the procedure for a sample that excludes war-time expansions.
The first row of Table 4 tests the hypothesis that the July 1924 expansion is from the same sample as the previous expansions. Since that 27-month expansion is only the 8 th longest, the rank-sum statistic is equal to 8 and the hypothesis that the July 1924 expansion is from the same sample cannot be rejected. The second row of Table 4 repeats the test for the hypothesis that both the July 1921 and the July 1924 expansions are from a different sample (with longer length) than all previous samples. Since the rank-sum of these two expansions is 20, again the hypothesis of no change in length of expansions cannot be rejected.
The third and fourth rows repeat the above tests assuming that the only expansions in the second sample are the November 1927 and July 1924 expansion. In neither case can the null hypothesis of no change in length be rejected. The fifth row of Table 4 tests whether the 50-month-long expansion that coincided with the United States leaving the gold standard is from a sample with a longer duration than the previous expansions. Since this was the longest expansion on record, the rank-sum test statistic is 1, which is significant at the 0.05 level with 20 expansions in the first sample. Hence, after observing only the 1933 expansion and all previous expansions in our sample, it would have been reasonable to conclude that the first post-goldstandard expansion was drawn from a population with longer duration than the population from which all previous expansions had been drawn. This is verified by the next line in the table that shows the hypothesis that both the 1927 and the 1933 expansions are from the same process as previous expansions cannot be rejected.
The 1938 expansion lasted 80 months. Thus, as shown in rows 7 and 8 of Table 4 , the rank-sum test rejects the hypothesis that the 1938 expansion is from the same sample as earlier expansions, and also results in rejection of the hypothesis that both the 1933 and 1938 expansions have the same length parameter as earlier expansions.
The ninth row of Table 4 shows that the hypothesis that the 1945 expansion is from same sample as all previous expansions cannot be rejected. But rows 9 and 10 of Table 4 show that if the 1938 and 1933 expansions are combined with the 1945 expansion, then it must be concluded that the second sample has longer length than the first. Table 5 repeats the tests presented in Table 4 but excludes wartime expansions. The results are similar to those in Using data on the lengths of all 31 recessions in our sample, Table 6 presents the MannWhitney Wilcoxon statistics for several breaks in the sample. The null hypothesis is that recessions in the second sample are the same length as recessions in the first sample versus the alternative that recessions in the second sample are shorter. The maintained hypothesis is that other characteristics of recessions in the two samples are identical.
The first row in Table 6 assumes that the first recession in the second sample is the recession that began in January1920. The second row assumes the next recession, that of May 1923, is the first recession in the second sample, etc. Notice that for each break in the sample the hypothesis that recessions are the same length in both samples is rejected in every test. The existence of so many relatively short recessions after the end of the first world war is the reason for this result.
But because the August 1929 recession lasted 43 months, the highest significance levels are reported for tests that place this recession in the earlier sample (rows 5-10 of Table 6 ). Row 6 of Table 6 reports the highest significance level, implying that recessions became shorter beginning with the February 1945 recession. But the second highest significance level is obtained by assuming the first recession in the second sample is the 1937 recession, the first postgold standard recession. Hence the results in Table 6 are most favorable for the hypothesis that recessions became shorter beginning with the February 1945 recession. However, the results imply that it is more likely that recessions became shorter beginning with the 1937 recession rather than beginning with the 1948 recession. Table 7 reports tests results for recessions using a sample that leaves out recessions that follow a wartime expansion. Rows 5 and 6 show that the optimal break in the sample is either the first post-gold standard recession, or the first post-war recession. Because the Z-statistics in rows 5 and 6 of Table 7 are approximately the same, we do not have a meaningful way to choose between these prospective breakpoints. Table 8 uses the Wilcoxon statistic to examine when an observer would have noticed that recessions have gotten shorter using a sample that includes all recessions. The first row of Table   8 shows that after the 1937 recession ended, since it was only the 7 th shortest on record up to that time, 7 the hypothesis that the 1937 recession has the same duration as previous recessions cannot be rejected. That is, there was no reason to suspect that recessions had gotten shorter after observing only the 1937 recession. The second row of Table 8 shows that there was also no reason to suspect that recessions had gotten shorter starting with the 1945 recession. Similarly, the third row of Table 8 shows the same result for the hypothesis that the 1937 and 1945
recessions are drawn from a sample with the same duration parameter as previous recessions.
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The fourth row Table 8 show that immediately after the 1948 recession a observer could have rationally concluded that recessions had become shorter beginning either with the first-post-gold-standard recession, or the recession at the end of the second world war. Table 9 repeats the tests reported in Table 8 but only uses recessions that do not follow a wartime expansion. From Table 9 it is clear that excluding these war-related recessions would have prevented one from noticing the shortening of recessions until the end of the 1957 recession. But, again, one must include the 1948 recession or both the 1948 recession and the 1937 recession in the second sample in order to conclude that the duration of recessions had declined.
4.3. The ratio of expansion to recession length.
Tables 10-13 present results based on the complete business cycle measured from trough to trough by employing the ratio of expansion to recession length. 9 The ratio of expansion to recession length is an appropriate measure because an increase in expansion length, coupled with a decrease in recession length, unambiguously causes this ratio to increase. (On the other hand, an increase in expansion length coupled with a decrease in recession length has an ambiguous effect on the total length of a business cycle.) 10, 11 Also, note that this method largely eliminates the problem of ties when calculating the Wilcoxon statistic.
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The first row in Table 10 assumes that the first business cycle in the second half of the sample is the cycle that began with July 1921 business cycle trough. The Wilcoxon statistic is 13 158, which implies rejection of the hypothesis that the ratio of expansion to recession length is unchanged in favor of the alternative that the second half of the sample has a larger ratio. If the first business cycle in the second sample is either the cycle that begins with the July 1924 trough, or the November 1927 trough, the result is the same. Indeed, for every break in the sample considered on Table 10 , the hypothesis that the ratio of expansion to recession length has not changed is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the ratio is larger in the second half of the sample.
But notice that the marginal significance level dramatically falls if the first business cycle in the second half of the sample is the first post-gold standard cycle. (Based on the Z-statistic, its marginal significance level is 0.00038) Hence, the most likely break in the sample occurs at the same time that that the United States left the gold standard. Table 11 repeats the tests presented in Table 10 but excludes wartime cycles. The results are the same as those presented in Table 10 . For every break considered in the table, the hypothesis of no change in the ratio is rejected in favor of the alternative that the ratio has increased. Furthermore, the highest marginal significance level is obtained if the first cycle in the second half of the sample is the first post-gold standard cycle, which began with the March 1933 recovery.
Using all 31 cycles in our data set Table 12 asks when an observer would have first noticed a change in business cycle behavior. The first row of Table 12 assumes that the 1927 expansion and the following recession have just been completed. Since the ratio of the 1927 expansion to the 1929 recession is the smallest in the sample, the Wilcoxon statistic is 20. This implies a failure to reject the hypothesis that the ratio of expansion to recession length has remained unchanged (in favor of the alternative that it has increased). 13 The second row of Table   12 assumes that the 1927 and 1924 cycles are in the second sample. The hypothesis that these two cycles have the same ratio parameter as previous business cycles also is not rejected (in favor of a higher ratio).
In the third row of Table 12 it is assumed that the 1933 expansion and the following recession have just ended. Because the ratio of expansion length to recession length is the second highest (up to that point) we reject the hypothesis that the ratio has not changed in favor of the hypothesis that expansions have become longer relative to recessions. The fourth row shows that lumping the 1927 cycle with the 1933 cycle reverses this result.
If the only cycle in the second sample is the 1938 business cycle (row 5 of Table 12 ), the hypothesis of no change in business cycle behavior is rejected (in favor of the alternative that expansions have become longer relative to recessions). This result obtains because the 1938 cycle has the highest ratio of expansion to recession in the sample up to that point. Row 6 of Table 12 shows that if both the 1933 and the 1938 cycles are in the second sample, the result is a dramatically lower the marginal significance level. Row 7 of Table 12 shows that adding the 1927 cycle to the second sample leads to a rejection of the hypothesis that the ratio of expansions to contractions has increased.
Finally, the last three rows of Table 12 show that the hypothesis that the 1945 cycle has the same ratio of expansion to contraction length as previous cycles is rejected only if the 1938 cycle or both the 1938 and 1933 cycles are also included with it in the second sample. Since the lowest marginal significance levels reported in Table 12 occur when the 1933 cycle is in the second sample, clearly these results support the hypothesis that the ratio of expansion to recession length increased at the time the United States left the gold standard in 1933. Table 13 repeats the tests reported in Table 12 but employs a sample that includes only non-war business cycles. Again, in Table 13 the lowest marginal significance levels are obtained when the 1933 cycle is in the second sample. Hence, the tests reported in Table 13 also imply that expansions became longer relative to recessions before the Second World War, and that the optimal breakpoint is March 1933.
The Romer Chronology
Christina Romer (1994) argues that the prewar NBER dates are flawed because they are based, in part, on detrended data. The use of detrended data results in an overstatement of the time the economy spends in recession since a period of positive, but below trend growth may be characterized as a recession. Using industrial production data, she develops an algorithm which allows her to produce an alternative business cycle chronology. 14 Table 14 Second, Romer's methodology generally leads her to date troughs somewhat earlier and peaks somewhat later than the NBER methodology making recessions shorter and expansions longer than those identified by NBER reference dates. As a glance at the right-hand side of As will be seen, the 18-month 1938 expansion preceding this 3 month recession plays a large role in fixing the breakpoint for the series on economic expansions. Table 15 presents our results for expansions. Based on the Z statistic, the probability of a break is maximized with the expansion beginning in March 1940. The second highest probability of a break is with the July 1932 expansion, which coincides with the ending of the gold standard. Clearly, the very short recession in 1939 plays a crucial role here, since the corresponding expansion is only 18 months compared with 80 months under the NBER dates.
However, the series created by taking the ratio of expansion length to the length of the following contraction is much less sensitive to the inclusion of such a short recession. Using this data, as reported in Table 16 , the probability of a break in the series is maximized with the 1932 expansion. Further, this date is chosen rather decisively over the expansion beginning in 1940.
The conclusion that U.S. business cycle behavior changed when the U.S. left the gold standard appears to be robust to Romer's alternative business cycle chronology. Further, by placing the emphasis on the role of the monetary regime, this conclusion is consistent with Romer's (1999:38-42) Since the choice of monetary regime seems to affect the length of business-cycle expansions, this suggests that there are important short-run nonneutralities of money. This is consistent with the monetary histories of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Yeager (1976) and Eichengreen (1992) , who emphasize the role of monetary factors in economic fluctuations and in particular, their role in the Great Depression. To the extent that March 1933 is accepted as a breakpoint in the data set for expansions, this poses a challenge for real business cycle theorists to explain why a change in the monetary regime is associated with a change in business-cycle behavior. Our finding is consistent with the evidence presented by Basu and Taylor (1999) , who find, using pooled data for fifteen countries, that the volatility of output and the real exchange rate vary with the exchange rate regime. Their results also suggest that a change in the monetary regime leads to a change in business cycle behavior.
It might be objected that the March 1933 expansion was somehow exceptional by virtue of following the great contraction of 1929 -1933 . However, Sichel (1991 finds that expansion length is independent of the length of the previous contraction. This suggests that the 1933 expansion truly reflects the effects of the monetary regime change rather than being some sort of artifact from the Great Depression.
Most previous work has taken as given that World War II represented the break in the data on business cycle behavior. Previously, there have been some informal (i.e., no statistical tests were performed) observations which placed the break at an earlier date. As early as 1959, Burns (1960) had noted the mildness of recessions starting with the 1937 recession. Our results
in Tables 8 & 9 confirm the accuracy of Burns' observation based on the business cycle data available at the time he wrote. Moore and Zarnowitz (1986: 766) break the data at 1933 in their discussion on the increasing length of expansions and decreasing length of contractions. Moore (1983) argues that the change in business cycle behavior is linked to a change in the behavior of wholesale prices. He notes that the period subsequent to 1932 marks an unprecedented period of persistent increase in wholesale prices. While Moore mentions a wide range of government policies which might be responsible for the change in business cycle behavior, he does not make a specific linkage to the gold standard.
It is frequently argued that recessions often result from mistakes in monetary policy making, and there are several issues related to this point which are worth mentioning. First, to the extent that the Federal Reserve has learned better over time how to utilize its discretionary powers, it is all the more impressive that the break in the data occurs right at the point in the data set where gold is abandoned. In fact, the 1937 recession is generally attributed to a monetary policy mistake; reserve requirements on banks were doubled between 1936 and 1937 (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963: 461) . The very long peacetime expansions in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that learning may have taken place.
Further, note that even if all post 1933 recessions were the result of monetary policy mistakes, this does not imply that discretionary policy action is destabilizing. We must ask destabilizing relative to what? We have one particular policy rule to compare discretion to, and that is the gold standard. Of course, this does not provide a resolution to the rules verses discretion debate; there may be rules which provide greater stabilization (as measured by the length of expansions and contractions) than either the gold standard or monetary discretion. Still, the results strongly suggest that discretion is stabilizing compared with this one particular rule.
Under the NBER dates, the economy was in expansion 54% of the time during the gold standard period. Since leaving gold, the economy has spent 84% of the time in expansion. The corresponding numbers under the Romer dates are 70% and 85%. This indicates that the time spent in recession has been cut in half, under the Romer chronology. However, this greater stabilization has come with a price; a persistent inflationary bias in policymaking can be traced to the demise of the gold standard. 17 Under the gold standard, there was long run price stability.
Since 1933, the price level as measured by the CPI has risen by a factor of more than 10, reflecting an average inflation rate of about 3.7% per year.
1 If the current expansion up through June 1999 is included, the average postwar expansion is 56.8 months.
2 World War II is taken to be the break point in all the statistical analyses we cite below.
3 However, when the questionable contractions of 1887 and 1899 are eliminated and treated as part of longer expansions, p values on the Wilcoxon test fall to between 10 and 20 percent. 4 These results are generally confirmed in the recent work by Haimowitz (1998) .
5 This section of the paper follows Diebold and Rudebusch (1992: 998) with some modification.
6 Actually Bradley recommends resolving ties by doing two sets of tests. One set assigning ranks most favorable to the alternative hypothesis and one set assigning ranks least favorable to the alternative hypothesis. Bradley makes this recommendation because resolving ties by using the average rank changes the distribution of the Wilcoxon test statistic. In fact it makes the distribution dependent upon the number of ties in the sample. Here we only resolve ties assigning ranks in a manner unfavorable to our alternative hypothesis to save space and because the results remain largely favorable to our hypothesis. We do, however, note that other writers, even though they recognize that it causes the distribution to depend upon the number of ties in the sample (e.g., Gibbons, 1976) , nevertheless recommend that ties be resolved by the use of the average rank.
7 Although there were three recessions 13 months long before the 1937 recession, the procedure here is to order ties in the way least favorable for the null hypthesis. In this case that implies ranking the 1937 recession the 7 th shortest rather than the 4 th shortest.
hypothesis that the 1937 and 1945 recessions have the same length as previous recessions would be rejected in favor of the hypothesis that beginning in 1937 recessions became shorter.
9 Diebold and Rudebusch (1992: 1002) also present a test using this ratio. 10 We also examined the complete business cycle by examining the length of cycles from trough to trough. Although these results provide strong support for the notion that business cycles became longer before the second world war, the optimal break in the sample is in 1927. This result is obtained because the unusually long 1929 recession causes the 1927 to 1933 business cycle to be the 4 th longest up to that point in time and the 7 th longest in the entire sample. In contrast, the 1933-38 and 1938-45 cycles respectively are 9 th and 4 th in total length in our sample.
In fact, it is the length of these three business cycles that has caused previous writers (such as Diebold and Rudebusch, 1992) to conclude that there is no difference in total cycle length between prewar and post-war cycles. Indeed, if the first business cycle in the second sample is the 1945-49 cycle, we fail to reject the hypothesis that business cycles have the same length in both samples. If the first business cycle in the second sample, however, is any of the business cycles from the 1921 cycle to the 1938 cycle, we find that the second sample has a longer length.
11 Alternatively, one could test the whole cycle by considering the ratio of recession length to the length of the following expansion. For present purposes this method is inferior to the ratio of expansion to following recession length for two reasons. The first is that it requires mixing the last gold standard recession of 1929 with the first post gold standard expansion of 1933. The second is that it causes the loss of one observation since the NBER reference dates begin with the December 1854 expansion and the length of the recession previous to it is not available. Be that as it may, tests based on the ratio of recession length to following expansion length lead to the conclusion that the optimal break occurs when the first post-gold standard business cycle is also the first cyle in the second sample. (In this case, business cycles are measured peak to peak, so that the first post-gold-standard business cyle is from May 1937 until February 1945 12 The only tie is between the business cycle beginning in December 1867 and June 1894 both of which have an expansion to recession ratio equal to 1. But since both cycles are always in the first sample the resolution of this tie has no effect on the Wilcoxon test statistics calculated here. 13 The hypothesis of no change in the ratio of expansion length to recession length reported in the first row of Table 12 would be rejected if the alternative hypothesis is that the ratio had become smaller.
14 Watson (1994) has also prepared an alternative chronology. While Romer's (1994) approach is to try and correct the prewar dates by using a superior methodology, Watson's approach is to estimate the postwar cycles using the prewar methodology. Given our interest in accurately determining the breakpoint for U.S. business cycle behavior, we decided not to use the Watson dates in our robustness test. Table III of Bradley, 1968 . The abbreviation n.s. means not significant. Table 13 . Non-war cycles only, how soon an observer would notice that cycles are different using ratio of expansion length to following recession length. Table III of Bradley, 1968 . The abbreviation n.s. means not significant.
